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Abstract: Two types of analyses are conducted to explain the determinants of labour 
contracts length. The first analysis emphasizes on the contracting costs and the level of 
uncertainty. The second analysis focuses on the incentive and selection effect of the 
contract length. This paper test the determinants for contract duration by means of 
econometric duration models. The estimates are carried out from French data (TDE). An 
econometric treatment of the endogeneity of the labour contract status and unobservable 
heterogeneity is carried out. Our results show that wages positively affect employment 
duration. This confirms the positive effect of contracting costs reported.  
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1. Introduction: 
 The recent period is characterized by an evolution of the working relationship in the 
industrialized countries. Indeed, many studies highlight an increase in the proportion of short-
term contracts. There is a growth in these temporary forms of employment compared to 
longer contracts in France as well as in the other European countries. 
The literature about contract duration can be classified in two distinct categories. A 
first type of analysis (Canzoneri, 1980; Dye, 1985; Danziger, 1988) considers the duration of 
contracts from an external point of view. By external we mean that the temporary dimension 
of the employment relationship between an employer and one or more workers results from a 
search for a structure which can efficiently adapt to uncertainty affecting the external 
environment of the firm represented by real and monetary shocks. A second type of analysis 
(Cantor, 1990; Jovanic, 1979; Lazear, 1979; Loh, 1994) apprehends the duration of 
employment according to the internal environment of the firm. It is the search for 
performance in personnel management, selection of skilled workers, and control of the input 
of work which generates the duration of the relation between the employer and the employee. 
To do so, firms have to incite, control and organize these human resources by means of 
contract duration.  
The early theoretical contributions emphasize that uncertainty and volatility are 
negatively related to contract length, whereas contracting costs positively affect duration. 
Gray (1978) argues that contract length should be positively related to transactions costs and 
inversely related to uncertainty, regardless of whether the uncertainty pertains to real or 
nominal shocks. These implications arise from two basic ingredients: a transaction-cost 
argument and an efficient-production argument. The former emphasizes that longer contracts 
lower the losses due to transaction costs. The latter stresses that shorter contracts reduce the 
expected losses due to inefficient production and employment. This is true because the 
expected losses increase with the deviation of the actual real wage from the real wage that 
would equate the demand and supply of labour, and such a deviation is greater for more 
distant periods as uncertainty rises over time. Dye (1985) builds a model which tries to 
overcome some of the limitations of Gray’s approach, finding the same theoretical 
implications about uncertainty and contracting costs. 
More recent models, however, stress that uncertainty and volatility may have a 
positive effect on contract length under some circumstances. Danziger (1988) develops an 
implicit contract model where workers are risk averse and firms are risk neutral. Within this 
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framework, contracts allow for efficient-risk-sharing between parties and provide workers 
with a means of insuring against income fluctuations due to aggregate productivity shocks. As 
a consequence, greater real uncertainty causes workers to seek increased insurance through 
longer contracts. 
In the following analysis, we will limit ourselves to an internal analysis about 
personnel management: the role short-terms contracts can play in the policy of incentive and 
control of employees. Studies in labour microeconomics based on game theory implicitly 
point out this principle again since they stress the importance of the temporary framework on 
the behaviours adopted by the agents and the results of game. In the same way, Lazear (1979) 
like Cantor (1988, 1990) proposed a dynamic approach of personnel management. 
Cantor (1988, 1990) highlights a certain number of determinants of the optimal 
contract duration: this tends to decrease when the present preferential rate increases, or if the 
cost in term of utility associated with the same effort is higher. On the other hand this duration 
lengthens when the share of the quasi rent allocated to the employee increases.  
In the next part, we will study shorter contracts as a probationary stage, in a context 
where optimal matching is not immediate and where dismissal costs dissuade firms to break 
contract relations. We will also point out how temporary contracts can be stepping stones to 
permanent employment. Recent studies dispute the common view that fixed-term contracts 
actually offer firms increased flexibility due to restrictions that typically apply to the rolling 
over of these contracts (Hunt, 2000).  However, firms have a number of reasons to use fixed-
term contracts or temporary contracts. First, temporary workers may be preferred because 
they are less costly to employ. Second, fixed-term contracts, like other temporary contractual 
types, are preferred alternatives when temporary or temporarily vacant positions need to be 
filled. Third, in the case where there is uncertainty about the value of the match. The theory of 
the matching suggested by Jovanovic (1979), constitutes the model of reference integrating 
this dimension of the labour market. According to these authors, it is necessary to install a 
mechanism making it possible to produce an optimal pairing in order to reach an efficient 
production. Firms view the initial fixed-term contracts as a probationary stage. Depending on 
the job performance and labour demand, workers will move into permanent employment 
within the firm. As pointed out by Loh (1994), Rosen (1994) and Lazear (1995) probationary 
periods may induce self-selection of those workers with higher ability because they have a 
higher probability to obtain permanent contracts. Temporary contracts with lower wages are 
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therefore a sorting instrument for firms. Low wages during the temporary contract period will 
be compensated for by higher future wages at the same employer (Lazear, 1979). 
This paper use the French data to investigate the external and internal determinants of 
the contract length evoked in the literature analyses. In the next section we highlight the 
econometric problems encountered to test the micro-economic determinants of the duration of 
the contracts. In the third section, data used for this study is examined. Estimation results are 
reported in the forth section. Finally, a synthesis of the main results is given as a conclusion. 
 
2. The econometric model 
The econometric evaluation of the determinants of the labour contract duration 
encounters a basic problem, ie the endogeneity of the labour contract status. Indeed, the 
employment duration on the labour market varies  according to the contract status. Since the 
selection into longer or shorter contracts is not random, it is important to account for the 
selection mechanism in order to estimate the determinants of contract duration in an unbiased 
way and this was demonstrated through some empirical studies which investigate the 
endogeneity of the contractual status on the employment duration (Booth and Al, 2002b). 
Moreover, Hagen (2003) stresses that it is necessary to take the mechanism of selection into 
account to estimate unbiased effect of fixed-term contracts (FTC) on wages. 
According to the econometric model, the duration of survival in employment has to be 
estimated with the various labour contract statuses. In the sample, the distribution of the 
individuals between the different classes of employment contracts is not random but raises  an 
endogenous selection mechanism. We propose a model representing three types of labour 
contract market: Indefinite-Term Contract (ITC), Fixed-Term Contract (FTC), Temporary 
Contract (TC). 
The issue of selecting individuals is made clearer if the individuals’ specific 
characteristics determine the choice of the contract. We can suppose that some of these 
determinants also have an influence on the duration of survival in employment. The problem 
which we encounter is to isolate the real effect of the labour contract status. It is therefore 
necessary to determine the elements which influence the duration of the employment contract 
and we will adopt the method suggested by Heckman and Robb (1985) for that purpose. The 
advantage of this method is that it offers a very vast choice of duration models. However, if 
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we adopted the Heckman’s method (1979)1, we would had to restrict ourselves to normal 
distribution. 
Our approach initially consists in instrumenting the probability whether the individual 
has an indefinite-term contract (ITC) or a fixed-term contract (FTC), or a temporary contract 
(TC) by a multinomial logit model2. The predicted probabilities are then integrated for final 
estimation in the parametric duration model in order to control for the endogeneity of the 
labour contract status. The econometric model is introduced in the following way : 
 
First step: selection model 
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We estimate iDE , the employment duration, according to the individual characteristics iX  and 
the estimated probabilities for the labour contract status. The parametric estimation of the 
duration model under this specification makes it possible to obtain unbiased estimators. 
3. Data 
We exploit data from a French survey called Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi 
(TDE), conducted by the Research Direction of Employment Ministry (DARES). It deals with 
people who became unemployed in 1995 and were interviewed each year until 1998.  
This survey provides large information both on individual characteristics, type of 
labour contracts and employment duration. The sample includes 2289 individuals. All 
individuals have returned to employment after a period of unemployment. The average 
                                                 
1Heckman’s approach (1979) suggests introducing the Mill’s ratio in a duration equation. In order to correctly 
estimate this approach, the residuals in both equations (selection and duration models) have to follow normal 
distribution, which restricts the approach for the duration model. 
2 In order to ease the interpretation of the estimated parameters, we choose the temporary contract  as the 
reference. 
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unemployment duration is about 10 months. Information on the length of new labour 
contracts after unemployment periods until the survey was completed concerns the types of 
contract and the size of firms of the new positions, the individual characteristics, the search 
strategies for the new labour contract, the causes for unemployment and the duration of the 
latest labour contract. Table1 reports the means of various variables in the sample. 
 
4. Estimation results: 
4.1 Multinomial logit estimation of labour contract status:  
In this section, the determinants of the labour contract status (ITC, FTC, TC) are 
analysed by the estimation of the logit multinomial model (see table 2). This corresponds to 
the estimation of the sample selection of our model.  
The fixed-term contract (FTC) concerns especially workers aged 16-34, relative to the 
base of individuals over 50 years old. Since the majority of young people have no 
professional experience on the labour market, they accept even precarious working 
conditions. This result is confirmed by Booth, Francesconi and Frank (2002a) on English 
data. However, it is noticed that workers aged 34-50 are granted indefinite-term contracts 
(ITC). 
 Lazear and Rosen (1990) and  Booth and al. (2002a) show that women more often 
hold temporary contracts. This result confirms that being a man has a positive and significant 
probability of getting an ITC. The chances of having an established position under indefinite 
contract duration are higher for Europeans than for non-European people.  
The results show that workers with low human capital (primary education, general 
education and techniques) hold more temporary contracts than the workers with university 
degree. People who undertook university studies have a higher probability to obtain indefinite 
contract duration.  
We use the occupation of the individuals’ father as a proxy for permanent income. 
Social origin variables indicate that children of executive or intermediary professions have a 
higher probability of holding indefinite-term contracts relative to children of workmen. On the 
other hand, children of farmers hold fixed-term contracts whereas temporary contracts meet 
more success with children of workmen.  
Relative to resignation, individuals entering unemployment  at the end of their FTC 
have a lower probability to obtain an ITC than dismissed individuals and those who left their 
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last employment for others causes (such as end of the probationary period or end of military 
service). This result highlights the significance of the status when recruiting and selecting on 
the labour market. These results are consistent with Waldman’s hypothesis (1990) in an "up-
or-out contract" environment and Spence’s signal theory (1973) on the labour market. If 
employers are uncertain about the unobservable characteristics of employees like ability or 
motivation, the individuals employment history may serve as a signal. References from 
previous employers and the causes of entry in unemployment may include information on the 
unobservable characteristics of workers. If the previous employment history involves bad 
signals and there are no alternative applicants available, the employer will hire the worker on 
a shorter contract.  
Examining the significance of the search strategy for employment enables us to 
classify a grid of research for each type of labour contract. Indeed, using market methods 
(reference: schools) increases the probability of getting an ITC or FTC. The probability of 
holding a fixed-term contract is greater when individuals use a local employment agency as 
well as the market method for search in new employment.  
Individuals with unemployment benefit are more likely to reach fixed-term contracts 
or temporary contracts than indefinite-term contracts. The local rate of unemployment tends 
to increase the probability of precarious employment (FTC-TC). Persistence of 
unemployment obviously makes the recourse to this type of employment much more frequent. 
4.2 Analysis of the results of parametric estimation: 
In this section, various parametric estimates were carried out while controlling the 
endogeneity of labour contract statuses (see table 3). In order to compare the various 
specifications (Weibull, Log normal, Log logistic), the Akaike information criterion is used. It 
is the model minimizing the function of the information criteria which is chosen, i.e. the 
Weibull distribution model. The hazard rate of leaving employment is thus monotonous. In 
order to reinforce the robustness of the econometric estimate of the Weibull specification, we 
estimated this duration model by introducing a correction for unobserved heterogeneity by the 
Gamma distribution (Lancaster, 1990). In the next part, we will interpret the results relative to 
this distribution duration in table 3. The significant character of the associated coefficient of 
heterogeneity (theta) indicates the relevance of the use of the Weibull model with correction 
of the unobservable individual effects.  
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The respective coefficients of variables PITC, PFTC, PTC indicate the predicted 
probability value for an indefinite-term contract, fixed-term contract and temporary contract. 
These variables control the endogeneity of the labour contract status over employment 
duration. The coefficients of PITC, PFTC, and PTC are very significant. Indeed, it is noticed 
that individuals under an ITC or a FTC have employment duration significantly longer than 
those under a temporary contract. Therefore, individuals under an ITC or a FTC improve their 
chances of stabilization in an employment position compared to people with other contractual 
statuses.  
Concerning the age of individuals, compared to individuals in the first age class (16-25 
years), individuals in the second and the third classes have significantly longer employment 
periods. The introduction of interacted variables (status of contracts × Female) enables us to 
conclude that the fact of being a woman under a ITC or a FTC reduces the employment 
duration, although being under these contracts has a significant and positive effect over the 
employment duration. That confirms the effect of discrimination according to gender evoked 
by Booth et al. (2002a) and Lazear and Rosen (1990). 
The individual employment history seems to be very important. Individuals with the 
latest employment duration (from 2 to 5 years) and a long duration (from 5 years and +) have 
a significant and positive effect over the duration of new employment than people with a 
latest employment of shorter duration (from 0 to 2 years). This result is in conformity with 
those of the Spence (1973), Looh (1994), Rosen (1994) and Lazear (1995) theory. The 
employment history may also capture characteristics like ability or motivation which cannot 
be observed. A further explanation suggests that employers hesitate to hire workers with an 
unstable labour market history under indefinite contract duration. Employment duration varies 
according the size of firms. Compared to firms employing over 200 employees, workers in 
firms with 49 to 200 employees have longer employment spells.  
The introduction of the wage variable into the duration equation confronts us with a 
possible problem of endogeneity. For this reason, the difference in actual wages and predicted 
wages resulting from the estimate of Mincer equation of (1974)3 has to be introduced. The 
individuals having a wage belonging to the third and fourth quartile have longer employment 
                                                 
3The results of the estimate of the equation of wages are presented in table 4. This method consists in 
introducing the estimated residual (real wages - predicted wages) of the duration equation in order to detect the 
endogeneity of wages. The non-significativity of the coefficient allows us to deduce that there is no correlation 
between the residue of wages and employment duration.  
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spell than those of the first quartile. That confirms the positive effect of the contracting costs 
evoked by Gray and Canzoneri over the contract length. 
Location in the CERGY, MANTES POSSY, and ROUBAIX labor-market 
employment areas has a negative and significant effect over employment duration compared 
to AIX and MARSEILLES. This can be due to the fact that these areas are characterized by 
more uncertainty on the job supply. 
5. Conclusion: 
The microeconomic analysis of contract lengths proposed in this article highlights 
several stylized facts. On the one hand, the analyses of Gray (1978), Canzoneri (1980), and 
Danziger (1988) argues that contract length should be positively related to transactions costs 
and inversely related to uncertainty, regardless of whether the uncertainty pertains to real or 
nominal shocks. The second analysis of contract length as an internal mechanism of personal 
management shows the influence of time-limited contracts on the incentive with the effort, 
and the selection of the skilled workers. 
The contract length has to be estimated with the various labour contract statuses. In the 
sample, the distribution of the individuals between the different classes of employment 
contracts is not random but raises from an endogenous selection mechanism. The estimates 
were carried out starting from French data called ‘Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi’ 
(TDE), conducted by the Research Direction of Employment Ministry (DARES). An 
econometric treatment of the endogeneity of the labour contract status (indefinite-term 
contract (ITC), fixed-term contract (FTC), temporary contract (TC)) by Heckman and Robb 
(1985) method and unobservable heterogeneity (Lancaster, 1990) was carried out. 
The results of the estimate of a duration model by introducing a correction of 
unobserved heterogeneity by the Gamma distribution conclude that there is an endogeneity of 
the labour contract status. Besides, employment duration is all the more large as wages are 
high. This confirms the positive effect of the contracting costs evoked by Gray and Canzoneri 
over the contract length. Moreover, the fact of having a latest labour contract of over two 
years of time can explain the increase in the duration of the recent contract, which is close to 
the theoretical results of the Rosen and Lazear models. 
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Table 1 : Descriptive statistic 
List of variable Means Observations 
Age   
CLASSE1 : [ 16  ; 25[ 25.1 2289 
CLASSE2 : [ 25  ; 34[ 38.0 2289 
CLASSE2 : [ 34  ; 50 [ 33.2 2289 
CLASSE2 : [ 50  ; +[  3.7 2289 
Female 45.1 2289 
Nationality   
EUROP : european        94.3 2289 
NOEUR : not european 5.7 2289 
Skill level    
ETPRI : primary education 7.4 2289 
CYEG :  general education. 20.5 2289 
ENTC : technical education 52.1 2289 
ENSUP : university degree 20.0 2289 
Socio professional category of father :   
AGRIP : agricultural 2.1 2289 
TRINP : independent worker 9.2 2289 
CPPLP : executive or professional 9.5 2289 
PIITP : intermediary profession 14.6 2289 
EMPYP : employee 10.6 2289 
OUVRP : workman 53.2 2289 
INACP : non participant 0.1 2289 
Reason of leaving previous occupation:   
LICEN : dismissal 33.2 2289 
DEMIS : resignation 13.4 2289 
PRECA : end of contract 49.0 2289 
OTHER 4.4 2289 
Search strategy of new employment :   
RESEAU : social and  professional network 43.0 2289 
PROMAR : market, spontaneous appliances 31.6 2289 
INTPUB : ALE  12.3 2289 
ECOCON : schools ,examinations 13.1 2289 
INDEMCHO : unemployment benefits 58.0 2289 
Labour contract status of new employment:   
FTC : fixed-term contract 44.8 2289 
ITC  : indefinite-term contract 32.3 2289 
TC  : temporary contract 22.9 2289 
Size firms:   
T1   : [ 0  ; 49 [ 60.8 2289 
T2   : [ 49  ; 99 [ 10.7 2289 
T3   : [ 99  ; 200 [ 7.5 2289 
T4   : [ 200  ; + [ 21.0 2289 
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Duration of latest employment (years)   
DURCTE     : [ 0  ; 2[ 69.28 2289 
DURMOY   : [ 2  ; 5[ 17.76 2289 
DURLONG : [ 5  ; +[ 12.96 2289 
Job areas :   
CERGY 13.3 2289
MANTES 10.3 2289
POSSY 12.8 2289 
ROUBAIX 15.5 2289
LENS 15.8 2289
AIX 9.1 2289
ETANG 6.8 2289
MARSEILLE 16.4 2289
Continues variables :   
EMPLDUR : Duration of new employment in months 6.37 2289
AGE : individual age 31.66 2289 
ANNEES ETUDES : Number of education years  13.45 2289 
SALMEN : Monthly wage of new employment in Euro    1115.512   2289 
TXCHOM  : rate of unemployment 13.44 2289 
Notes: Data from a French survey called Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE), 
conducted by the Research Direction of Employment Ministry (DARES). It deals with people 
who became unemployed in 1995 and were interviewed each year until 1998. 
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 Table 2 : Estimation results of Multinomial Logit  
 ITC FTC 
Variable coefficient T-student coefficient T-student 
CLASSE1 : [ 16  ; 25[   0.528 0.962   0.906*** 3.661 
CLASSE2 : [ 25  ; 34[  0.826*** 3.436   0.815*** 3.536
CLASSE2 : [ 34  ; 50 [  0.561** 2.302   0.472 1.017
CLASSE2 : [ 50  ; +[  Base Base    Base Base
MEN  0.859*** 6.295   0.514*** 4.046
FEMME  Base Base    Base Base
EUROP : european  Base Base    Base Base
NOEUR : not european  -0.426* 1.665  -0.253 -0.997
Skill level    
ETPRI : primary education -0.611** -2.061  -0.580** -2.104
CYEG :  general education. -0.580*** -2.643  -0.613*** -2.961
ENTC : technical education -0.479** -2.447  -0.525*** -2.841
ENSUP : university degree  Base Base    Base Base
Socio professional category of father :     
AGRIP : agricultural  0.017 0.035   0.264* 1.668
TRINP : independent worker  0.179 0.765  -0.109   -0.476  
CPPLP : executive or professional  0.721*** 2.691   0.440 1.541
PIITP : intermediary profession  0.350* 1.656   0.279 1.405
EMPYP : employee -0.214 -0.968  -0.069 0.198
OUVRP : workman  Base Base    Base Base
INACP : non participant  0.278 1.205   0.047 0.089
Reason of leaving previous occupation:     
LICEN : dismissal  0.617*** 2.991   -0.051 -0.537
DEMIS : resignation  Base Base    Base Base
PRECA : end of contract -0.545*** -2.875   0.173*** 2.801
OTHER  0.611** 1.753   -0.006 -0.961
Search strategy of new employment :     
RESEAU : social and  professional network  0.509*** 2.656   0.339*** 4.735
PROMAR : market, spontaneous appliances  0.191 0.988   0.382*** 3.524
INTPUB : ALE  -0.395* -1.672   0.335***  3.421
ECOCON : schools ,examinations  Base Base    Base Base
Job areas :     
CERGY  0.648***   2.724   0.507** 2.166
MANTES  0.448*   1.753   0.576**    2.361
POSSY  0.614**   2.527   0.638***    2.697
ROUBAIX -0.047  -0.211   0.639***    3.175
LENS -0.819***  -3.815  -0.078   -0.414
AIX / MARSEILLE  Base Base    Base Base
ETANG -0.225 -0.851  -0.012  -0.005
INDEMCHO : unemployment benefits  -0.096 -1.373   0.396** 1.673 
TXCHOM : unemployment rate  -0.035** -2.454   0.012* 1.678 
Correct Prediction 68.84%  74.25%  
Pseudo-R2 0.45    
Log Likelihood -2311.532    
Number of observations   2289    
Notes : Data from a French survey called Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE). 
(***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%.
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Table 3 : Estimation results of the Weibull duration model with Gamma correction 
 
 
Variable coefficient T - Student 
One 1.571  8.181*** 
PITC   : probability of  ITC 1.701  16.416*** 
PFTC : probability of  FTC 2.439  20.061*** 
PTC   : probability of  TC Base  Base 
CLASSE1 : [ 16  ; 25[  Base  Base 
CLASSE2 : [ 25  ; 34[ 0.121  3.344*** 
CLASSE3 : [ 34 ; 50 [ 0.162  4.020*** 
CLASSE4 : [ 50 ; + [ 0.047  0.698 
MEN Base  Base 
FEMME -0.144 -5.202*** 
PCDI  * FEMME -1.108 -3.611*** 
PCDD * FEMME -1.503 -3.955*** 
EUROP : european -0.043 -0.844 
NOEUR : not european Base  Base 
ETPRI : primary education Base  Base 
CYEG :  general education. 0.216  4.080*** 
ENTC : technical education 0.217  6.953*** 
ENSUP : university degree 0.217  6.967*** 
Duration of latest employment (years)   
DURCTE     : [ 0 ; 2[ Base  Base 
DURMOY   : [ 2 ; 5[ 0.127 3.927*** 
DURLONG : [ 5 ; +[ 0.155 4.069*** 
Size firms: 
T1   : [ 0  ; 49 [ 0.085  2.562** 
T2   : [ 49  ; 99 [ 0.129  2.718*** 
T3   : [ 99  ; 200 [ 0.137  2.552** 
T4   : [ 200  ; + [ Base  Base 
Monthly wage of new employment :   
First quartile        [591, 3900[  Base  Base 
Second quartile   [3900, 7000[  0.036  0.985 
Third quartile      [7000, 33600[  0.126  3.446*** 
Fourth quartile    [33600, 56000]  0.198  5.077*** 
Job areas  
CERGY -0.076 -1.911**
MANTES -0.157 -3.591*** 
POSSY -0.141 -3.370***
ROUBAIX -0.300 -6.631***
LENS -0.030 -0.688 
AIX / MARSEILLE Base Base
ETANG -0.01 -0.303
Sigma  0.274  17.943*** 
Thêta  1.653  9.619*** 
Log Likelihood -3453.545  
Number of observations  2289  
     Notes : Data from a French survey called Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE). 
     (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%.
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Table 4 : Estimate of Mincer equation (MCO) 
In order to determine the earning of education, Mincer (1974) estimates a wage equation :   udXSrSrAGEaAGEacYi  221221ln  
with iY , the individual income, 
AGE, 2AGE , age and squared age of individuals, 
S, number of years of education. A quadratic form is introduced to represent the concavity of 
earning education due to investment in human capital.  
Thus,   Srr
S
Yi
21 2
ln 
  corresponds to the marginal earning rate of education in which 2r  is 
supposedly negative, showing decreasing marginal earnings, 
 X, a vector of individual and parental characteristics, 
c, the constant term which is interpreted as the basic wage without human capital, 
and u is a stochastic term of mean 0, representing the unobserved factors affecting wages. 
 
Variable  coefficient T - Student 
One -1.023 -6.251*** 
AGE 0.238  19.420*** 
(AGE) 2 -0.003 -17.360*** 
EDUCATION YEARS 0.507  17.039*** 
(EDUCATION YEARS) 2 -0.015 -14.455*** 
EUROP : european Base  Base 
NOEUR : not european -0.089 -1.827** 
Married 0.025  1.122 
ETPRI : primary education Base  Base 
CYEG :  general education. 0.217  2.774*** 
ENTC : technical education -2.013 -0.257 
ENSUP : university degree 0.146  1.845** 
Socio professional category of father :    
AGRIP : agricultural 0.241 2.131*** 
TRINP : independent worker -0.106 -1.812** 
CPPLP : executive or professional 0.189 3.085*** 
PIITP : intermediary profession -0.002 -0.056 
EMPYP : employee -0.058 -1.035 
OUVRP : workman Base Base 
INACP : non participant -0.038 -1.286 
R2 corrected (Adjusted)  58.62  
Log Likelihood -2371.34  
Number of observations 2289  
     Notes : Data from a French survey called Trajectoires des Demandeurs d'Emploi (TDE). 
     (***) significant at 1%, (**) significant at de 5%, (*) significant at 10%. 
 
